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Current discussions of hermeneutical injustice, I argue, poorly characterise the cognitive state of 
victims by failing to account for the communicative success that victims have when they 
describe their experience to other similarly situated persons. I argue that victims, especially when 
they suffer moral wrongs that are yet unnamed, are able (1) to grasp certain salient aspects of the 
wrong they experience and (2) to cultivate the ability to identify instances of the wrong in virtue 
of moral emotions. By moral emotions I mean emotions like indignation that reflect an agent’s 
ethical commitments and bear on her ethical assessments. Further, I argue that victims can impart 
their partial understanding of the wrong they suffer to others who are not similarly situated by 










        In Aeschylus’ Suppliants, the daughters of Danaus, having fled their home in Egypt, land on 
the shores of Argos and plead with King Pelasgus asking for his protection. Their uncle 
Aegyptus’ sons who seek to marry them forcibly are in pursuit of them. But the king is puzzled. 
He does not understand why the women are pleading with him. The women reply,  
So that I may not be [taken as] a slave for the sons of Aegyptus.1 
Pelasgus is still confused. He asks after the motivations of the women,2 
Is this because of hatred, or are you talking about something wrongful?  
Perhaps the source of his confusion is that the consent of a woman is not required for her 
marriage according to ancient Greek custom.3 A Greek marriage is based on an agreement that 
the future husband and the bride’s father or male relative reach. The idea of female consent, in 
the relevant sense,4 does not seem to have existed for the ancient Greeks. This explains the 
 
1      All references from Aeschylus’ Suppliants, unless otherwise stated, are from Christopher Collard’s translation. 
“Suppliants,” Aeschylus: Persians and Other Plays, trans. Christopher Collard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), Line 335. I have modified the translation of this line to more literally render ‘δμωῒς’- the term refers 
specifically to female slaves taken in war, and so identifies a special category of slave. Here it presumably refers to 
the possible seizure of the women by the sons of Aegyptus. In Greek the sentence reads, ὡς μὴ γένωμαι δμωῒς 
Αἰγύπτου γένει. 
2      A great deal of scholarship on The Suppliants has focused on this question of the motivation or reasons - why they 
refuse to marry the sons of Aegyptus. See for instance S. Ireland, “The Problem of Motivation in the Supplices of 
Aeschylus,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 117. Bd., H. ½. (1974): 14-29. J. K. Mackinnon, “The Reason for 
the Danaids Flight,” The Classical Quarterly 28, no. 1(1978): 74-82. But these discussions overlook the possibility 
that Aeschylus left the motivations of the women deliberately obscure as Winnington-Ingram suggests and as seems 
most plausible. See “The Danaid Triology of Aeschylus,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 81 (1961):141-152. 
Winnington-Ingram argues that the “stress” of the play is on the “lack of consent.” (Page 144). More recent 
scholarship has also drawn attention to the issue of forced marriage and female agency in the play. See for instance, 
Thalia Papadopolou, Aeschylus: Suppliants (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 8-9. Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz, “Greek 
Tragedy: A Rape Culture,” Eugesta 1(2011): 1-21. For my purposes, it is enough if the issue of forced marriage and 
the women’s unwillingness is one of the key issues in the play. 
3      See John Howard Oakley and Rebecca Sinos, The Wedding in Ancient Athens (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press,1993), 10. 
4      Although some forms of rape were regarded as criminal and deserving of punishment, the Greeks do not seem to 
have articulated the wrongness of rape in terms of consent of the woman. The wrongness of rape was frequently 
understood in terms of the harm done to her father or her husband. Part of the problem here is that the term most 
often used for rape, i.e., hubris, has a very wide semantic range and could refer to nearly act of abuse or exploitation 
that affected the honour of an individual or household. I discuss the term briefly in Section II of the paper and in 
n.51 below. See Rosanna Omitowoju, Rape and the Politics of Consent in Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 38-39. 
king’s confusion. If it were possible for women to withhold their consent in marriage, it would 
not matter why they do so. It would be enough that they are unwilling. It is because the customs 
do not require the consent of the women that the king asks if the women have suffered some 
wrong at the hands of the men, i.e., if they have any legitimate grievance against them. The 
women, on the other hand, are faced with defending their rejection of this marriage. They have to 
communicate the sense in which they feel wronged in being forced into a marriage even though 
existing socio-ethical norms do not specify such a wrong.  
 
In a now famous work, Miranda Fricker describes the epistemic wrong that a person 
suffers in being rendered incapable of understanding and of articulating to others a “patch” of her 
own experience because of a “lacuna” in “collective hermeneutical resources.”5 She calls it 
‘hermeneutical injustice.6’ In the Suppliants, the Danaid women seem to suffer from precisely 
this lacuna in their inability to express the wrong they suffer in being forced into marriage. 
Women in classical Greece were generally excluded from public roles, including the political, 
legal domain, and so were excluded from participation in institutions and practices that construct 
social meanings. An important consequence of this exclusion was that the body of social 
meanings of their community became “structurally prejudiced” in particular ways.7 For instance, 
the wrongness of rape in classical Greece did not include the harm suffered by a woman.8 And in 
the play, the notion of female consent for marriage is similarly unavailable to the women. 
 
 
5      Miranda Fricker, “Hermeneutical Injustice,” in Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2007), 168. 
6      Fricker is concerned with the problem of victim’s own understanding of what she faces, though Fricker also 
touches on the issue of being unable to articulate (to others) the experience to others. See Fricker, “Hermeneutical 
Injustice,” 150. where Fricker talks about a woman “being at a loss to describe” her experience to others.  
7      Fricker, “Hermeneutical Injustice,” 165. 
8      See Sinos 38-39. 
The play is of interest to us because it dramatises the problem of hermeneutical injustice 
and it culminates in a resolution. Following a long exchange between the women and the king 
that occupies the central core of the play, the women succeed in conveying some sense of the 
wrong they suffer. Towards the end of the play, king Pelasgus begins to voice the concerns of the 
women.9 The women’s success owes to a distinctive use of rhetoric, emotive and persuasive 
speech in a play where persuasion itself is thematised in contrast to the violence their suitors 
employ and come to signify.10  
 There are lessons in the Suppliants for our understanding of the problem of 
hermeneutical injustice especially as it concerns unnamed wrongs, wrongs that are yet to be 
conceptualised and made part of a community’s shared understanding such as forced marriage in 
the context of the play.11 In this paper, I approach the play and the problem of hermeneutical 
injustice by way of Aristotle’s understanding of emotion (pathos) considered first in its function 
of aiding an agent’s grasp of moral wrongs and subsequently in its element in persuasive speech. 
In the former role, I argue that moral emotions like anger aid in the understanding of unnamed 
wrongs, and in the latter, that they prove useful in communicating the wrong to a third-party (by 
way of eliciting pity for instance) and in aiding the conceptualising of the wrong. I use 
Aristotle’s account of emotions in part because it is useful for understanding the role of pity in 
the tragedy, Suppliants, but also because it can account for the experiences of victims in 
 
9     And in the final act of the play, Pelasgus confronts the herald sent by the sons of Aegyptus who seeks to take the 
women away forcibly, and tells him that he may take the women only if they are willing and well-disposed toward 
them, and that he may not take the women by force (ταύτας δ᾿ ἑκούσας μὲν κατ᾿ εὔνοιαν φρενῶν ἄγοις ἄν) 
10     Persuasion (peithō) in ancient Greek, is contrasted with violence (bia) and associated with Athenian democracy as 
opposed to foreign tyrannies. On the role of the persuasion in the Suppliants see R. G. A. Buxton, Persuasion in 
Greek Tragedy: A Study of Peitho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 89-90.  
11    Fricker does not explicitly state what the victim of hermeneutical injustice lacks. In her earliest discussion on the 
subject Fricker discusses the lack as a lack of a “name” for the relevant experience. But in her later work, she 
describes it as the lack of a concept. I follow her later work and understand the lack as that of a concept. See 
“Hermeneutical Injustice” 160, and Fricker, “Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance,” The Epistemic 
Dimensions of Ignorance, eds. Rik Peels, Martijn Blaauw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 165. 
Fricker’s own descriptions (as discussed in sections 1 and 2 below). 
 
I show that morally significant emotions such as pity, anger, or indignation, can furnish 
preliminary understandings of moral wrongs that are not yet fully conceptualised. They do so 
because they can be based in, what we might call, preconceptual moral awareness, specifically a 
capacity to discern instances of the relevant wrong and a grasp of certain salient aspects of it. My 
aim is to both sharpen our understanding of the problem of hermeneutical injustice and, more 
importantly, to outline victims’ resources for its resolution specifically in cases where socio-
ethical concepts are involved. And in both respects, I see myself as offering a corrective to 
Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice.  
More specifically, I argue that (1) victims of hermeneutical injustice, though lacking 
conceptual understanding, can have awareness of an unnamed wrong in virtue of their affective 
experience such as the anger or humiliation they feel in suffering a wrong. And (2) victims can 
impart their understanding, however partial, of the wrong they suffer to sympathetic third parties 
by eliciting moral emotions such as pity that are tied to broad notions of justice and fairness. In 
section III of the paper, I illustrate (2). Note however that communication of the sort mentioned 
in (2) is preliminary to further clarification and explication that situates the wrong in the context 
of wider norms and other ethical concepts.  
To be clear, I am not denying the harms of hermeneutical injustice. Such injustice renders 
marginalised persons vulnerable to further harms as Fricker argues convincingly. It affects their 
epistemic selves, eroding their confidence, and putting their credibility as speakers at risk.12 
What I intend to do here is get clear about what cognitive resources a victim can have in virtue of 
 
12   Fricker “Hermeneutical Injustice” 159-160 
her own experience and how these resources may be used for conceptualising the wrong she 
suffers. Ultimately, I agree with Fricker that “actual eradication” of this sort of injustice requires 
social “equality.”13 But, under conditions of inequality or, worse, oppression, victims themselves 
need to and often do in fact lead the way to new conceptual understanding of unnamed wrongs. 
As already mentioned, I use Aristotle’s account of emotions in my discussion throughout 
the paper. This is not the place to lay out the details of the textual interpretation on which I rely, 
but the parts of the account that are relevant here are, (1) emotions need not involve conceptual 
structures,14 and (2) they have normative, ethical content. 15 Although for Aristotle all emotions 
are ethically significant ((2) above), for my purposes here it is enough if we allow that at least 
some emotions, let’s call them ‘moral emotions,’16 are ethically significant in this way. For 
instance, Aristotle defines pity as a “a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, 
which befalls one who does not deserve it,” i.e., an evil or terrible misfortune that one could 
 
13   See Fricker, “Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice,” Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, eds. Ian   
James Kidd, José Medina, Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., (Oxon: Routledge University Press, 2017), 55. 
14   I do not mean to claim that affective states are intrinsically independent of conceptual structures. I take it that at least 
some affective states do not involve fully conceptual content. These can instead be based on preconceptual 
apprehensions, perceptions, or imaginings. I leave it open that some states of pathē might involve beliefs (and so 
concepts). For a discussion of pathē along these lines see Anothy. W. Price, “Emotions in Plato and Aristotle” in 
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 134-
135. Stephen Leighton, “Passions and Persuasion,” in A Companion to Aristotle, ed. G. Anagnostopoulos (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 597-611. 
15   This is a widely accepted view about Aristotle’s πάθη. See, for instance, Nancy Sherman, Gisela Striker, Martha 
Nussbaum, and more recently, Jessica Moss and Jamie Dow. Nancy Sherman, “Discerning the Particulars,” in The 
Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 13-55. Gisela Striker, “Emotions 
in Context: Aristotle's treatment of the Passions in his Rhetoric and Moral Psychology,” in Essays on Aristotle's 
Rhetoric (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 286-302. Martha Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Emotions and 
Rational Persuasion,” in Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, ed. A.O. Rorty (Berkeley; London: University of California 
Press, 1996), 303-23 Jessica Moss, “Phantasia and the Apparent Good,” Aristotle on Aristotle on the Apparent 
Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48-64. Jamie Dow, 
“Feeling Fantastic Again—Passions, Appearances, and Beliefs in Aristotle,” in Passions and Persuasion in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 182-225. 
16   For contemporary accounts of such moral emotions see, for instance, Allan Gibbard, “Moral Feelings and Moral 
Concepts,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 1, ed. R. Shafer-Landau (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 
195-215. 
expect to come upon oneself or one’s friends.17 So pity in this sense is a way of apprehending 
suffering that is undeserved.18 I will present independent, philosophical, and non-textual 
arguments for both claims I make of moral emotions, (1) and (2), in section II of the paper 
below.   
 
In Section I, I consider problems with Fricker’s account in the way it portrays the 
cognitive state of victims and their communicative abilities. In Section II, I outline my proposal 
for cognitive aspects of moral emotions and the role they can play in moral, preconceptual 
awareness under conditions of hermeneutical injustice. Section III discusses constraints on 
communication under conditions of hermeneutical injustice where the relevant concept, here an 
unnamed wrong, is missing. Section IV returns to the communicative success of the women in 





Fricker develops her account of hermeneutical injustice using an example from Susan 
Brownmiller’s memoir, In Our Time: A Memoir of a Revolution. In 1974, Carmita Wood worked 
at a nuclear physics lab at Cornell when a distinguished professor targeted her repeatedly with 
 
17    Aristotle Rhetoric 1385b14-18. Note also that all references of the texts of Aristotle, unless otherwise stated, are 
from Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Vol. 2, rev. & ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1984). 
18    Pity involves notions of moral desert. As David Konstan argues, some forms of “ethically neutral conditions such as 
death, old age, and disease, were also considered pitiable.” It is unclear how these were grasped as cases of 
undeserved suffering but, perhaps, as Konstan speculates, “certain kinds of catastrophe never seem truly to be 
deserved” See David Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 205. 
aggressive sexual behaviour and unwanted attention. Wood’s complaints were dismissed as a 
personal problem, as the understanding of ‘sexual harassment’ nor the term existed at the time. 
Suffering from severe physical symptoms stemming from the stress her abuser caused, Wood left 
her job. When she subsequently applied for unemployment compensation and was asked about 
the reasons for quitting, she is unable to adequately communicate the situation the claims 
investigator.19 Later she sought out Lin Farley who invited her to her seminar where Wood 
shared her story and at once the women in the room, the students and staff included, had a 
moment of revelation. Every one of them had had a similar experience at some point in their 
lives. And they begin the task of coining the term “sexual harassment.” 
Fricker writes that Wood suffered from a “cognitive disablement that prevents her from 
understanding a significant patch of her own experience” because the collective hermeneutical 
resources have a “lacuna where the name of a distinctive social experience should be.20” So, 
hermeneutical injustice seems related to the lack of a name, a label that identifies an experience. 
But what does it mean that one is unable to understand an experience?21 Does the lack of 
“understanding” in Fricker’s sense imply an inability to categorise it or describe it or something 
else perhaps? Carmita Wood, though unable to reply to the claims investigator satisfactorily, has 
no trouble describing her experience at Farley’s seminar. She does so with great success even as 
 
19   Fricker writes that Wood is at a “loss to describe” the hateful episodes. However, Baker in a fuller discussion of the 
case uncovers transcripts of Wood’s hearing after her claim was rejected. She describes how Wood communicates 
the gist of her understanding, claiming that her abuser was a “dirty old man” who did not wish for her stay at her 
job. See Fricker “Hermeneutical Injustice,” 150. Carrie N. Baker, The Women’s Movement Against Sexual 
Harassment. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008). Baker’s account poses problems for Fricker’s description of 
Wood’s cognitive state. The right description would be to say that Wood had some understanding of her situation, 
but lacking general terms to describe them (as she describes only the particular actions and intent of an individual), 
her understanding is lacking. 
20   Fricker “Hermeneutical Injustice” 150-151 
21  Fricker vacillates in her description of what exactly the women lack. On page 152 of “Hermeneutical Injustice,” she 
writes that Wood is “prevented from understanding” her experience, but later on page 162, she writes that the 
experience is “barely intelligible” to Carmita Wood.  
her experience is immediately identified by other women at the seminar as of the same kind as 
experiences that they had had.22 Her ability to describe the experience in such a way suggests 
that she is able to discern some of the salient aspects of this sort of experience, though she may 
not have recognised that she has done so.23 This would explain why others were able to identify 
their own experience as being of a similar sort. Though Carmita Wood may not have been able to 
identify the experience as being of a certain sort, she could discern certain salient aspects of it 
and communicate them through her description. 
 
In the Suppliants, the women seem to know that it is wrong in some sense to be forced to 
marry these men; they ask Pelasgus repeatedly to do what is just or right (dikē) by them, where 
the term dikē seems to refer to a broad notion of justice.24 Trystan Goetze offers a useful 
distinction to clarify two senses of hermeneutical injustice. Goetze argues that hermeneutical 
injustice may involve communicative harm as opposed to cognitive harm (and, also, both).25 In 
instances of communicative harm, the victim has acquired knowledge of her experience but is 
unable to share her knowledge. Victims of cognitive harm, on the other hand, are prevented from 
attaining any significant knowledge of their own experience. Victims overcome cognitive harm 
by for instance forging the necessary interpretive tools within a small community of similarly 
 
22  As narrated in Brownmiller’s memoir and restated in Fricker’s book, a feminist recalls what happened in Lin 
Farley’s seminar when Carmita shared her story, “We realized that to a person, every one of us—the women on 
staff, Carmita, the students—had had an experience like this at some point, you know? And none of us had ever told 
anyone before. It was one of those click, aha! moments, a profound revelation.” Fricker “Hermeneutical Injustice,” 
150. My italics. Susan Brownmiller, In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution (New York, Delta: 1999), 279-295. 
23  Arguably, she is likely to recognise that she can do so after other women disclose similar experiences.  
24  The terms the women use throughout are variants of dikē. For instance, they ask the king to act justly toward them 
(line 82) and judge where justice lies (line 79). See also 384, 395. The word dikē has broad connotations including 
custom, order, right and judgment, especially in the play. As Robertson puts it, the term has “the broadest principles 
of equity.” See H.G. Robertson, “Δίκη and ὕβρις in Aeschylus’ Suppliants” The Classical Quarterly 50, no.3 
(1936):104-109. 
25  Trystan Goetze, “Hermeneutical Dissent and the Species of Hermeneutical Injustice,” Hypatia 33, no.1 (2018): 73-
90. 
situated knowers though they may remain unable to communicate with members of their larger 
social community. Thus, they suffer communicative harm.  
Yet Goetze’s distinction seems to oversimplify the case of hermeneutical injustice. 
Suppose we ask, how could one begin to articulate or explicate one’s experience? Plausibly, such 
a question can be answered even where there is incomplete self-understanding of the experience. 
Such articulation arguably occurred in Lin Farley’s seminar that Carmita Wood attended and 
where she spoke about her experience. The gap between cognition and communication seems 
thinner and more elusive than Goetze implies. It is in part through the business of articulating, 
the exercise of putting into words, that one comes to grasp one’s own experience. (And someone 
who fails to describe his or her experience, on solely epistemic grounds, i.e., all else being equal, 
as when a person’s description lacks clarity or definition does not strike us as someone who has a 
sufficient understanding of her experience.26) The effort of communication ought not to be 
reduced to delivery of pre-packaged information because communication allows for shaping, 
testing, and refining of ideas.  
Such a reductive notion of communication gives us a distorted picture of the epistemic 
wrong, because it depicts victims of hermeneutical injustice as fully dependent on the 
willingness of the larger social community to rectify the injustice that they suffer.27 But 
generally, victims of hermeneutical injustice seem to have substantially more agency and greater 
room to pursue creative solutions than both Fricker and Goetze recognise in their respective 
 
26  Goetze discusses the case of LGBTQ+ communities coining the term ‘agender.’ The term is known within the 
community itself, though it remains unknown to the larger community. But in this case, it seems that the issue here 
is not that further epistemic resources need to be uncovered, but rather that the term needs to receive social and 
political uptake. This seems different in kind from the cases where a genuine epistemic difficulty is posed in the 
communication of an idea such as sexual harassment where perhaps certain behaviours need to be sufficiently 
distinguished by certain other behaviours such as harmless flirtation. Goetze, 74. 
27  For instance, even those who have attained knowledge of their own experience are, by Goetze’s account, yet unable 
to remedy the communicative harm they suffer with respect to the larger community. 
discussions. 28 Again, in the Carmita Wood case, after Wood’ testimony the women collectively 
understand that they have identified a distinct social experience which allows some activists 
present at the discussion to eventually coin the phrase “sexual harassment.” My point is that 
Fricker’s account (and Goetze’s as well) fails to do justice to the cognitive resources that victims 
possess in cases of hermeneutical injustice.  
 
There is a second and related issue with Fricker’s account that it does not account for the 
resources that victims have or can leverage to impart some understanding of their experience to 
at least, certain third parties. Fricker’s primary suggestion for overcoming hermeneutical 
injustice is for listeners to cultivate certain virtues. She describes what she calls a “virtuous 
listener,” a person who listens pro-actively and with social awareness to victims.29 But this 
option, renders the victims entirely dependent on the good will of these virtuous listeners (who 
are likely motivated to preserve the status quo because it is to their own advantage), vulnerable 
in the interim; it also deprives victims the exercise of their agency in remedying their own 
situation. In her discussion of the speak-outs organised by women’s movements, Fricker suggests 
that the process of sharing the experiences with a consciousness-raising group awakens “dormant 
resources for social meaning,” which gets us some way toward understanding how relevant 
 
28  The point is also that Fricker’s and Goetze’s accounts do not make a distinction between degrees of deprivation and 
so fail to distinguish extreme cases where social knowledge and power are strictly isolated to very few figures or 
institutions (as in authoritarian regimes) from cases like that of sexual harassment in a patriarchal society. This 
problem is discussed very well in José Medina’s response to Fricker’s article. See “Hermeneutical Injustice and 
Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities,” Social Epistemology 26, 
no. 2 (2012): 221-235. 
29  Fricker, “Hermeneutical Injustice,” 171. Fricker assumes that the lack of self-confidence and trust in one’s own 
instincts that women and perhaps also all marginalized group suffer from in communicating with third parties is 
mainly a function of the hermeneutical lacuna, but this lack of self-trust and confidence does not seem specifically 
tied to the lack of linguistic resources in this particular context though exacerbated by it. Instead, the lack of self-
trust and confidence seems more general and possibly tied to the identity of marginalised groups in societies. It 
seems plausible that cultivating greater awareness about their recurring self-doubt and practices can prove salutary 
in overcoming the self-doubt that Carmita Wood and other victims face in articulating or attempting to communicate 
their own experiences. 
social meanings can be cultivated by the agency of the victims.30 But this is only the beginning 
of an answer.  
One might respond that the burden of this communication will be alleviated once the 
notion of sexual harassment is defined and publicised by others who have the authority to define 
social meanings, such as journalists or lawmakers, as Fricker suggests.31 This is surely true of 
communication in certain formal contexts. Communicating in courts and certain governmental 
bodies will certainly require this kind of effort, though in these contexts too definitions of terms 
are argued over and redefined many times over. Yet, it seems implausible to think that all 
interpersonal communication needs to wait for such an accomplishment and cannot even achieve 
some moderate success in the absence of it. In fact, we do engage in this sort of communication 
in relationships, friendships, with varying degrees of success. Psychotherapy is premised on the 
possibility of such communication. And as evidenced by the ample use of literary sources in 
Fricker’s own discussion, one could argue that such communication can occur with the aid of a 
writer’s evocative writing. And plausibly, these various communicative efforts can also be 
genuinely clarificatory, contributing to the elucidation of social meaning. 
Note also that Fricker’s solution rests on the mobilisation of large institutions and depicts 
the victims as lacking any recourse to pursue bottom-up, creative solutions and exercising their 
own agency.32 The problem in part, as others like Jośe Medina have pointed out, is that Fricker’s 
account of how social meaning is generated is too hierarchical; meanings seem to be generated 
 
30  Fricker, “Hermeneutical Injustice,”148. 
31   This seems implied by her remarks about the sphere where “social meanings are generated.” See Fricker, 
“Hermeneutical Injustice, 152.  
32   Jośe Medina offers a similar critique, pointing to the possibility of repeated efforts at communication among 
subjects, i.e., victims of hermeneutical injustice developing “a definite sense of the contours of social experience” 
even if the experience continues to lack a name. See Medina, “Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic 
Contextualism,” 208. 
from institutions of social power and handed down.33 And even so, social meanings presumably 
are not defined merely through stipulation by a lawmaker or a journalist but require some 
additional explicative work in addition to naming and a stipulated definition.34 And it seems that 
this sort of explication requires the participation of the victims themselves as they have first 
personal, privileged access to the experience in question. So, it turns out we are still missing an 






In this section, I argue that affective states may alert us to wrongs that we have not yet 
fully understood. So, victims of hermeneutical injustice have some understanding of the wrongs 
they suffer in virtue of their affective experience. Specifically, they would be able to discern 
instances of the wrong and grasp certain salient aspects of it.  
 
In Aristotle’s moral psychology, the habituation of an agent which involves learning to 
act and respond in the right sorts of ways precedes the reflective and, one might say, conceptual 
understanding of the reasons why these actions and responses are appropriate.35 Initially, one’s 
affective responses are not tied to appropriate explanations for what makes them appropriate, i.e., 
 
33  See “Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice,” in Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, eds. Ian James Kidd, José 
Medina and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., (Oxon: Routledge University Press, 2017), 43. 
34   In relation to this point 
35  In making this claim, I leave the larger issue of whether moral concepts or norms are prior to these affective 
dispositions in that they explain the appropriateness of our affective responses, open. Here I am only interested in 
the moral psychology of the agent, specifically in understanding how these norms come to be grasped by 
individuals.  
why they are called for in a given situation.36 This sort of justificatory, or explanatory, 
knowledge, on Aristotle’s view, comes later. But in its absence, one could still acquire an 
awareness of a kind not limited to knowing particular facts. As Iakovos Vasiliou puts it, 
habituation allows a person to “recognize an individual action as belonging to a particular ethical 
kind,” though, I would add that the ethical kind itself need not be fully specified nor yet 
explicitly grasped.37 This is because habituation, the development of moral character, involves 
repeated practice in action and affective responses in difference situations.38 Through practice, 
one learns how to feel and act in particular situations and thus presumably learns to discern the 
sort of situations that call for responses of a certain sort. For example, a well-habituated agent 
will discern situations that call for indignation and respond accordingly. So, the well-habituated 
person acquires affective dispositions for pity, anger, indignation, and so forth that support and 
inform her evaluative behaviour and attest to a developing ethical attitude or perspective.   
Whether or not we agree with Aristotle’s developmental account of the process by which 
all affective dispositions (or tendencies for having emotions) are acquired, we can admit that 
some ethically significant emotions need not require robust ethical concepts and can instead 
involve a minimal moral awareness. Alan Gibbard regards outrage as such an emotion,  
The naive young child feels outraged at one child’s hitting another, say, and thereby 
thinks the hitting wrong… At this stage [i.e., the early stages of moral education], the 
child doesn’t need a concept of outrage; it’s we who say that in feeling outraged the child 
 
36   Myles Burnyeat, “Learning to be Good,” in Essays on Aristotle 's Ethics, ed. Amelie Rorty (LA: University of 
California Press 1980), 73. 
37   Iakovos Vasiliou, “The Role of Good Upbringing in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 56, no.4 (Dec 1996): 784. Vasiliou has something even stronger in mind here, as it seems that the 
knowledge involved here could not be specified in precise rules and propositions. For my purposes here, we do not 
need the stronger claim. it is enough if we allow that such an awareness can be gleaned without the aid of explicit 
formulation of the relevant ethical kinds. 
38    As Burnyeat puts, it “practice has cognitive powers.” See Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good,” 73. 
classes the act as wrong.39 
Gibbard makes a distinction here between the child’s immediate affective response of outrage 
and the adult’s reconstruction of it. The child’s response of outrage, Gibbard argues, does not 
require the concept of outrage. She sees the act as wrong and is pained by it, presumably without 
being able to articulate why the act is wrong.40 We might imagine how the conversation with the 
child would go if she were asked why the act is wrong. She may respond to our question by 
simply restating that the child’s hitting another is wrong. One could argue that there is a nascent 
grasp of some sort of universal or general rule in her answer. But we can imagine her confusion 
when presented with more complex cases where it may seem permissible to hit a person, to 
subdue a person who is violent, for instance, because the person is in danger hurting themselves. 
It also does not seem likely that the child can articulate the wrongness of harming others in terms 
of individual rights or other more general moral concepts. 
           So, what explains her response of outrage? The child responds with outrage but not in 
virtue of explicit knowledge of relevant moral concepts. The child simply treats the hitting as 
wrong. As Gibbard argues, it seems implausible to describe what occurs in the child’s mind in 
terms of the complex analysis of outrage and its warrant. Something much more direct or 
immediate seems to be going on.41 She has a felt sense that a moral transgression has transpired. 
           Studies in developmental psychology support the idea of moral awareness evidenced in 
some moral emotions that do not require explicit and conceptual moral knowledge. One study 
showed that children between the ages of one and three exhibited “affective discomfort” at moral 
 
39    Gibbard, 205. My emphasis. 
40   Research in developmental psychology suggests that children are offer justifications for their assessments at around 
age three. See Gabriella Freda and Audun Dahl, “How young children come to view harming others as wrong: a 
developmental analysis,” in Social Cognition: Development Across the life Span, eds J. A. Sommerville and J. 
Decety (New York, NY: Routledge), 167. 
41    Gibbard 204. 
transgressions so exhibiting, what the authors call, “precursors or rudimentary” forms of guilt 
and shame (that develop with age) along with “spontaneous” efforts to repair the damage and 
concern for the wrongdoing of others.42 Here we may note the similarity with Aristotle’s 
account, as the children seem to have developed both the relevant affective response and a 
disposition to act in situations where the response occurs. A more recent study showed strong 
indications that 30-month old children feel emotions of guilt and shame that are robustly “socio-
moral,” i.e., the children are aware of certain actions as wronging others.43 The authors write that 
because the subjects who were wronged did not display overt signs of displeasure in the 
experiment the children’s response seems not be based on mere behavioural cues but reflected a 
“recognition that one is responsible for the well-being and harm of another person.” 44  
What is critical for our purposes is that due to the lack of both suitable reflective abilities 
and a developed sense of self in the children below three years of age, the conceptual ethical 
content that supports the observed affective responses seems thin and largely implicit. Though 
children of these ages were found to be responsive to the demands of justice or fairness and 
moral concern for others, it seems unlikely that these notions are developed and explicit in any 
appreciable degree. Like the child in Gibbard’s example, toddlers in these studies seem to have 
moral awareness that supports felt, affective response to moral transgressions. This nascent 
awareness is argualy, preconceptual. 
 
 
42    Nancy Eisenberg, “Emotion, Regulation and Moral Development,” Annual Review of Psychology, 51 (2000): 665-
697. 
43   Jesse Drummond et al, “Helping the One You Hurt: Toddlers’ Rudimentary Guilt, Shame, and Prosocial Behavior 
After Harming Another,” Child Development 88, no.4 (2017): 1-24 
44   Jesse Drummond et al, 13. 
So, in some cases, especially in the course of moral development, one has a sort of 
preconceptual moral awareness. This awareness, we will find, is sufficient for discerning 
instances of the relevant kind and involves understanding of some distinct aspects of the kind. 
Audre Lorde gives us a thick description of an encounter that produced an awareness of racial 
hatred in her, 
My mother spots an almost seat, pushes my little snow suited body down. On one side of 
me a man reading a paper. On the other, a woman in a fur hat staring at me. Her mouth 
twitches as she stares and then her gaze drops down, pulling mine with it. Her leather-
gloved hand plucks at the line where my new blue snow pants and her sleek fur coat 
meet. She jerks her coat closer to her. I look. I do not see whatever terrible thing she is 
seeing on the seat between us — probably a roach. But she has communicated her horror 
to me. It must be something very bad from the way she’s looking, so I pull my snowsuit 
closer to me away from it, too. When I look up the woman is still staring at me, her nose 
holes and eyes huge. And suddenly I realize there is nothing crawling up the seat between 
us; it is me she doesn’t want her coat to touch… No word has been spoken. I’m afraid to 
say anything to my mother because I don’t know what I’ve done. I look at the sides of my 
snow pants, secretly. Is there something on them? ...45 
In the passage Lorde describes an interaction on a subway. The three-year old child perceives the 
disgust of the woman she sees. She gets that there is some “terrible thing” that the woman is 
horrified by. Looking fearfully between the seats and then looking up at the woman and meeting 
her stare that betrays her revulsion, the child “suddenly realises” that she in fact is the object of 
the woman’s disgust. She perceives that something about her person makes her the target of the 
 
45   Audre Lorde, “Eye to Eye: Black Women, Hatred, and Anger,” in Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (New York: 
The Crossing Press, 1984), 147-148. My emphasis 
woman’s disgust as she searches her own clothes to find an answer. The child grasps an aspect of 
the hate by analogy to the quick aversion that a roach inspires in her.46 In the look of the woman 
the child perceives that something about her is “very bad,” “terrible” even. The woman’s way of 
looking at her makes an impression and sometime later when the child meets a man who looks at 
her in a way that reminds her of the lady on the subway, she knows she is seeing the same (sort 
of) thing.47 
           As contemporary philosophers might put it, the child has acquired the ability to pick out 
instances of racial hatred toward black persons, even though she cannot yet name them as 
instances of racial hatred.48 Though she does not fully grasp it, the child becomes attuned to this 
hatred and feels its “heaviness” sharpened by an as yet “unexpressed anger.”49 Lorde writes in 
the same essay that in that part of her childhood, though she felt the hatred “echoed” in movies, 
newspapers and other places, and especially in the “eyes” of many white people, she “had no 
tools to dissect it” and “no language to name it.” 50 The ability to analyse the hatred presumably 
has to wait on improved conceptual knowledge.  
The example from Lorde gives us a sense of what a preliminary grasp of a concept might 
look like. To further spell out what is involved in this nascent affective awareness that I have 
been alluding to, I turn again to Aristotle’s account of habituation. Habituation, for Aristotle, 
 
46   Lorde’s description here may not fully reliable as she writes the account retrospectively from an adult perspective.    
But her account is plausible and supported by the developmental psychological work cited in n.42 and n.43 that 
strongly suggests are responsive to moral transgressions of certain kinds, which implies that they are discerning 
distinct instances of such transgressions. 
47   Lorde, 148. 
48   The child’s preconceptual awareness may not be sufficient for correctly identifying all instances of racial hatred. 
Her capacity for such identification is limited perhaps, to intentional acts, such as the action of the woman in the 
subway. Presumably, with time and exposure to more instances, her concept will develop to include unintentional 
acts as well. Note however, that the child does not have a misconception about racial hatred but only an incomplete 
notion of it. I thank one of the referees of this article for pointing this out. 
49   Lorde describes her anger as a child as “unexplained anger” Lorde, 149. 
50   Lorde, 148. 
involves developing a certain discriminatory, recognitional capacity, a capacity for seeing 
actions and situations in specific ways.51 Put another way, affective awareness in moral emotions 
involves a sensitivity or responsiveness to ethically relevant features of situations. Emotions are 
elicited by particular persons in particular situations. One feels pity for this person and how 
things have turned out for her. And we feel pity in so far as we perceive her situation as in a way 
similar to other situations previously learnt as piteous. If this is right, we can see why emotions 
do not require explicitly articulated content. They can proceed from an awareness of certain 
features or an ability to pick out certain features (along with an implicit grasp of relevant 
similarity).  
One might argue that seeing a particular situation in a certain way requires a set of 
grouping criteria. Put differently, perceptual awareness of a situation as being of a certain sort, 
that requires conceptualisation of the relevant sort of situations. But firstly, one does not need 
specific, clearly articulated set of criteria to be able to sort. We know this from studies in infant 
learning and animal cognition.52 In both studies, sorting was evidenced in the absence of 
linguistic ability and so sorting seems not to require linguistically articulated criteria. But more 
to our point here, recognising similarity between the situation of the women in the play, for 
example, and other more readily recognisable situations of violence, especially when analogy is 
employed, requires no explicit criteria. It is usually the absence of such explicit criteria (or our 
ignorance of them) that prompts us to employ analogies in communication. And analogies in 
 
51  On this point, see Kristján Kristjánsson, Aristotle, Emotions, and Education (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 
36. See also Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 254-62. This view is shared 
by other commentators on Aristotle’s discussion of habituation and was perhaps pioneered in Myles Burnyeat’s 
paper, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good.” 
52   See for instance a famous paper published by L.B. Cohen and J.S. Hussaim, “Infant Learning of Ill- Defined 
Categories,” Merrill- Palmer Quarterly, 27, no. 4(1981): 443-456. See also Loveland and Hernstein’s experiments 
on categorisation observed in pigeons. R. J. Hernstein, & Loveland, D. H.  “Complex Visual Concept in the 
Pigeon,” Science 146 (1964): 549-551. 
literature tend to be informative and so, presumably, the similarities between the analogs were 
not obvious in the first place. As we shall see in the following section, Aeschylus’ suppliant 
women in their plea present their plight as analogous to Io’s. The instance of Io is well known 
from mythology and is part of the cultural knowledge the women share with the king. This 
analogy enables the king to recognise the women’s’ situation as pitiable much as Io’s situation is 
known to be.  
The point about habituation generalises for all ethical learning. Just as children first 
cultivate habits of action and affective responses, so too adults are likely to develop affective 
responses before they develop suitably spelt-out understandings of the situations that they are 
responding to.53 As noted, Aristotelian moral development involves in part the cultivation of 
suitable affective responses and the affective responses come with discerning capacities and a 
nascent awareness of relevant moral notions. On the picture I have sketched, emotions (along 
with perception and, perhaps, imagination) are (or can be) a source of moral cognition quite apart 
from thought and reflection,54 and we might plausibly suppose that they will likely remain so 
long after the infant grows into an adult.55 If so, victims of hermeneutical injustice will have 
 
53   Feminist philosophers, following Alison Jaggar have argued for this kind of epistemological work that emotions can 
perform, particularly in the discussion of “outlaw emotions” or emotions that are emotions that are felt by 
marginalised persons in a community that diverge from the emotions that accord with the hegemonic view of the 
situation. In my account, I suggest that besides anger and such emotions as victims of epistemic injustice may feel, 
other moral emotions such as indignation and pity that may be felt by non-marginalised members in one’s larger 
community could also do important epistemic work. See Naomi Scheman, “Feeling Our Way toward Moral 
Objectivity,” in Minds and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics, eds. Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, and 
Andy Clark. (Boston: MIT Press, 1996), 228-229. See also, Alison Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in 
Feminist Epistemology,” in Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing, eds. A.M. 
Jaggar and S.R. Bordo (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 160.  
54 I defend this claim at length as an interpretation of Aristotle’s view of pathē (emotions) elsewhere. See The role of 
Pathē in Aristotle’s Ethics (ms.) 
55   Burnyeat suggests that this is so on Aristotle’s picture. See Burnyeat 80. One further reason for thinking that we 
retain emotions that derive from other cognitive sources besides thought and reflection, is the occurrence of 
recalcitrant emotions. Recalcitrant emotions contradict judgments or beliefs as for instance a person may have a fear 
of heights while knowing and judging that he is safe on top of a tall building, for instance. The existence of such 
emotions suggests that, at least, some emotions are independent of reflective judgment and thought. 
cognitive resources due to their affective experiences. Like Lorde, who as a very young child 
feels the pain and disgust of racial hatred and acquires the ability to discern it even though she 
lacks the relevant vocabulary, others faced with distinct, yet unnamed experiences that are 
morally significant can acquire the ability to discern instances of the same experience and form a 
nascent understanding of it.  
 
In this section, I have discussed moral emotions as a cognitive resource for victims of 
hermeneutical injustice. They can develop an ability to discern instances of the wrong they suffer 
and are aware of certain salient aspects of it. We can now understand why it might appear that 
such persons lack knowledge of their experience and why they themselves may feel so. Because 
their knowledge is tied to their affective experience, the experience may be felt to be subjective 
in the sense of particular and personal. 56 This is unsurprising given the nature of affective 
experience. Yet, the problem of communication with third parties remains. We can already see 
however that moral emotions might have some role there too. For the very reason that some 
moral emotions do not rely on explicit conceptual knowledge, they might aid outsiders, those 
who do not have the same affective experience, to grasp some aspect of the wrong that victims of 
hermeneutical injustice suffer and are unable to name. 
 
Now we can return to the case of the women in the Suppliants that we began with to 
 
56    Some of the earliest accounts of survivors of the Holocaust seem to have been in a similar situation where they are 
only able to describe their personal experiences, though in this case both the absence of proper vocabulary for the 
occurrences of the Holocaust at that time and the fact that Nazi actions were shielded from the outside world and 
any public discussion explains the lack of more abstract, general descriptions. In an interview from August 1946, a 
survivor, Nelly Bandy, describes the death march without being able to name it. See says, “All the route was 
bordered with corpses, you see…[the corpses] were men who had been led before us and had been shot like that.” 
See “David P. Boder interviews Mrs. Nelly Bandy, August 22, 1946, in Paris,” accessed September 2017 
https://iit.aviaryplatform.com/collections/231/collection_resources/17590  
consider how victims of hermeneutical injustice may be able to communicate to others in the 
larger community. Before doing so, I outline the limitations to such communication due to the 
nature of hermeneutical injustice, i.e., the absence of a relevant concept in the collective 




Communicating a wrong under conditions where the wrong itself is barely understood 
presents particular difficulties. In the case of the women in Suppliants, their situation of being 
subject to a forced marriage is not understood as a distinct phenomenon. And so, the women’s 
situation does not come with known and accepted markers for identification. If one were to claim 
that a person committed intentional homicide (at least in fairly straightforward cases), she then 
needs to demonstrate a motive and prove that the person did perform the action. Specific, 
distinctive features of intentional homicide are identifiable and known in advance and so could 
be used to prove homicide (though proving it might prove difficult in certain cases), but the same 
is not true of the women’s situation.  
 
In the play, the absence of these markers is vividly portrayed when the women argue that 
they are wronged, repeatedly describing the behaviour of their pursuers as outrageous (hubrin).57 
Hubris, as many scholars have noted, is notoriously hard to specify because of its broad and, at 
times, porous boundaries. As a legal term, it seems to have covered acts such as jeering at 
 
57    One might think that the women in thinking that they are wronged, must represent their experience as a specific 
kind of wrong. But this does not seem necessary. It seems possible that one can have some sense of being wronged 
where the wrong itself is only dimly perceived, i.e., significantly indeterminate.  
people, disobeying authority, taking the properties of others, in addition to sexual offenses.58 
Also, as Robertson has suggested, hubris, in the play, seems to have the broad sense of lawless 
violence as seen in its use alongside dikē that the women also repeatedly invoke in their pleas to 
the king, though hubris and dikē are not generally antonyms.59 The point is that when the women 
allege that their suitors are acting outrageously toward them, they seem to be saying no more 
than that the men have wronged them or that they have offended their honour, at least as far as 
the king understands them.60 This difficulty emerges in the play when Pelasgus responds to the 
repeated pleas of the women for justice with a retort. He says that if the men have power over the 
women according to the law of their state (i.e., Egypt), then their claim over the women could 
not be opposed.61 Pelasgus’ reply reveals that the women have failed to communicate what it is 
that they see as wrongful. 
One might think that the problem of communication that the women face can be 
overcome by appeal to higher norms that are very general in scope and which can reasonably be 
 
58    See Stephen. C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1993), 276-277. Though conceptually, 
hubris denotes a more serious offense and relates to affront to Gods and was also more seriously prosecuted being at 
time punishable by death, it was not a well-defined notion in legal practice. Though sexual offenses form the most 
important subgroup of the offenses of hubris that have been found in extant Greek legal sources, these offenses did 
not necessarily involve coercion or violence and instead were offenses that involved dishonour. Of the 500 or so 
known instances in legal documents, only 82 involved sexual offenses. See David Cohen, “Sexuality, Violence, and 
the Athenian Law of 'Hubris,'” Greece and Rome 38, no. 2 (1991): 172-173. As David Cohen notes, the applicability 
of the charge of hubris to any given case in front of the jury, was left “solely to the large body of lay judges/jurors 
who were responsible for deciding a particular case.” See Cohen, 179. 
59    Robertson, 105.  
60   They seem to articulate something like a general feature when claim that their marriage to the sons of Aegyptus 
would amount to slavery, as they say that they do not want to be [taken as slaves] by the sons of Aegyptus. See line 
335. But we must keep in mind that this connotation for the term slavery is not readily available in the ancient Greek 
context of the classical period. Doulos (slave) is semantically opposed to eleutheros (free person), but a free person 
is not conceived as someone who acts on his own will as opposed to being subject to the will of another. Rather a 
free person would be seen as someone who is politically not in a position of a slave (a part of the institution of 
slavery). In comparing their marriage to the sons of Aegyptus to slavery, the women are likely referring to the 
outcome of their physical capture and abduction by the sons of Aegyptus, if the Argives fail to protect them, since 
they use the term δμωῒς, which refers to female slaves taken in war. See LSJ, s.v. δμωή. 
61     Suppliants Lines 387-390. Aeschylus stresses this dilemma by repeating it in the final act when a herald from 
Egypt arrives at the scene claiming that the women are “lost property” and when the Pelasgus attempts to stay his 
hand, demands to know on what grounds he is denied the possession of the women. See lines 915 and thereon. 
felt as applicable to a given situation since they apply quite generally to almost all situations.62 
But to do so the women need to be able to articulate how the sort of situation they are facing 
violates a higher norm. And here the earlier problem resurfaces. One could argue that the women 
in the play might appeal to a higher norm such as protection from violence. The women would 
then need to argue that the violence that the men have committed (or threaten) resembles the 
violence of physical assault in crucial aspects. The violence that the women face is that of being 
forced to marry, so the women have to prove similarity between the compulsion that they face 
and physical assault. But, arguably, cases of compulsion are not easily re-described, i.e., without 
further argument and explication, as forms of assault. To make such an argument one would 
have to explain how verbal coercion limits agency and show that it does in ways that are 
relevantly similar to the way physical force does, since it is not obvious that the violence and 
verbal compulsion are relevantly similar or, at least, it is open to argument that they are not 
relevantly similar. 
Further, arguing from a higher norm may very well require that one also explicitly justify 
the extension of the scope of the norm to cover such cases as the one advocated for. One would 
have to argue that the norm of protection from violence, for instance, should apply (or that it 
does in fact apply) to the context of marriage. But this is far from easy in cases like these, where 
the victims of the wrong are socially and likely also legally disadvantaged, and the wrong barely 
understood. 63 Plausibly, these sorts of arguments can function as justifications or explanations of 
the extension of these more general norms after the wrong itself is more fully understood. In the 
 
62      In recent discussions on norms, some philosophers have argued that one important factor in norm   change is 
interpretation—or, rather, reinterpretation—of behaviour as falling under “some existing, overarching norm.” See 
Geoffrey Brennan et al, Explaining Norms (Oxford, Oxford University Press (2013), 110. 
63    In the present case, there is also a further difficulty in that the women are refugees and so it is unclear if and to what 
extent the norms of the state of Argos apply to them.  
play, it seems that the king is in a position to come up with such arguments and present them to 
the assembly of Argos whereas the women are not in the same position.64  
Notice also, that any attempt to establish by argument that the women are in fact wronged 
will confront forms of motivated ignorance and bad faith on the part of the listener because the 
listener likely benefits indirectly from the hermeneutical injustice. In this case, the king, like all 
male members of society benefits from the gender–based privileges that result in the 
marginalisation of the women that produces hermeneutical injustice of the sort we see here, and 
so the king might be motivated to protect these privileges (even if his motivation is 
unconscious).65 Affective appeals may be relied on to appeal more directly to one’s core moral 
values, values that are inculcated through habituation in one’s community and so entwined with 
one’s affective responses learnt in the same process. So, the best hope for the women is to 
convince the king of the injustice of their situation and the legitimacy of their appeal and trust 
that the king will then advocate for them in a suitable way.  
More generally, we may think of the specific context at issue here as interpersonal and as 
preliminary to an effort to argue the case with direct appeals to higher, more established norms. 
In Fricker’s example, we may imagine Carmita Wood approaching a lawyer and attempting to 
speak about her experience with him. In the context that I have in mind, the victim of 
hermeneutical injustice engages in conversation with a neutral and potentially sympathetic third 
party from her community and speaks against a background of shared socio-ethical norms. I will 
 
64     This fact is just a restatement of what Fricker describes as the condition of social “marginalisation” of the victims 
of hermeneutical injustice. Note also several legal theories including Bentham, Hart and more recently Raz (though 
with some more subtle differences exist between these accounts on the nature of the power), take “power” in the 
sense of permission granted through structures of state or constitution as central to legal change. Lars Lindhal, 
Position and Change: A Study in Law and Logic (Dordrecht, Holland:  Reidel Publishing Company, 1977), 194. 
65    In the play, the king says that he is not prepared to take up their cause, even though he well knows that he has the 
“power” to do so. Suppliants Lines 396-398. The decision facing him is complicated by the possibility of war with 
Egypt since the men who pursue the women are rulers. 
argue that the women make their appeal successfully by eliciting the king’s sense of pity,66 a 
moral emotion that concerns undeserved, indeed, unjust suffering inflicted on individuals and in 





In the Suppliants, the king asks about the misfortune that befell the daughters of Danaus 
but does not seem to understand the unwillingness of the women to marry their suitors. When he 
asks the women if they have any other legitimate grievance against the men who seek to marry 
them, the women reply, 
What woman would blame her lord and master if she loved him? 
And then the king says,  
Well, this is the way men increase their power.67 
The women’s reply underscores yet again their unwillingness to marry these men as they claim 
not to love them. The king defends the institution of marriage referencing the benefit that 
families, and especially men, accrue through marriage; it increases their social standing through 
alliance with other families. Yet again the failure of existing norms to accommodate the concerns 
of the women is illustrated. At this point, being unable to convey the sense in which they feel 
 
66   Appeals to pity, in ancient Greece, were recognised as part of forensic rhetoric or rhetoric used in courts for pleading 
one’s case and was a way of showing the legitimacy of one’s case. The emotion of pity is relevant here because the 
women’s appeal is arguably a form of appeal for pity. Since appeals for pity were a common feature in forensic 
rhetoric, and the king engages the women in a quasi-legalistic way by asking for their legitimate grievances, it seems 
plausible that the women are making this sort of an appeal. See Konstan for a discussion of other reasons why this 
sort of appeal may be construed as appealing for pity. Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 206. For a 
discussion of pity and appeals to pity in ancient Greek law see David Konstan, Pity Transformed (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2004), 27-48. 
67     Suppliants Lines 336-338.  
they are being wronged, the women resort to a more direct plea. They say, 
Hear me, son of Palaechthon,  
with a heart offering goodwill, you Pelasgian lord and king! 
and see me, your suppliant here, and in flight,  
running about like a heifer pursued by wolves, 
high up amid steepling crags, where trustful of his aid 
she lows to tell the herdsman of her plight. 68 
The women’s address calls for a certain receptivity on the king’s part to “hear” and to “see” their 
plight. In their address they depict their condition evocatively with the image of the hunted 
heifer. The women hope that the king (imaginatively) perceives their condition and recognises 
the wrongness of their plight through the image of the heifer. I propose that the plea reveals the 
way in which the suffering of the women is blameless and is caused by a particular sort of 
violence exemplified by the violence of a predator.69  
The women employ the image of the heifer in part because it recalls the myth of Io, the 
young Argive woman who was pursued by Zeus and punished by Hera. According to ancient 
legend (and as the women themselves recall the story in the play), Hera discovers that Zeus has 
seduced or coerced young Io70 and turns Io into a young cow, a heifer, as punishment. But when 
 
68    Suppliants  Lines 347-354. I have modified Collard’s translation slightly.  
69    There is some controversy as regards the notion of desert that, for Aristotle, underwrites pity. I follow Nussbaum’s 
interpretation of desert here as a notion best captured by responsibility. On this interpretation, the women are 
undeserving in that they are not culpable for the situation through their own actions. Kristján Kristjánsson argues for 
a simple, or primitive notion of desert that has moral force on its own without being grounded in moral or causal 
responsibility. We may note that even on this interpretation, the situation that the women face is shown to be pitiable 
in that it is excessively adverse and undeserved of anyone save perhaps that of an escaped criminal (or slaves) in 
ancient Greek society. See Martha C. Nussbaum, “Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion, “ Social Philosophy and 
Policy 13 (1996): 27.58. And Kristján Kristjánsson, “Fortunes-of-others Emotions and Justice,” Journal of 
Philosophical Research 28 (2003): 108-110. 
70     It is unclear if Zeus’ relationship with the young woman Io is consensual. In the play, the woman say that “that 
“Zeus lay with her, a mortal,” and that he embraced or struggled with her, as different translators have rendered 
“τἀμπαλάγματα.” I have followed Collard’s translation in understanding it as struggles. According to the LSJ, the 
meaning of the word is ‘embrace,’ but the only text cited is the Suppliants itself, so the dictionary is not very helpful 
Zeus continues to consort with Io, Hera sets a gadfly to sting her, forcing Io to flee Argos and 
wander the earth. The women in the above plea analogise their situation to that of Io, both of 
who suffer for being the object of male desire and pursuit and both of who are rendered fugitives 
because of it. And if the king recognises the plight of Io as involving undeserved suffering and as 
being pitiable, he will likely recognise the undeserved suffering of the suppliant women.71 
By their appeal, the suppliant women claim that the sons of Aegyptus, who are depicted 
in the image of the wolf in their plea, are pursuing them much as Io was pursued by the gadfly, 
or, indirectly, by Zeus. Io, as the king admits earlier in the play, is unfortunate (duspotmos), a 
mere victim of a conflict between Hera and Zeus and Hera’s wrath.72 Zeus’ attempts to consort 
with Io, the heifer, in the form of a bull are what instigate Hera’s wrath in punishing Io with a 
gadfly that forces her to wander across the earth as a fugitive.73 In particular, the mythic instance 
reveals the vulnerability of the young woman, Io, who is at the mercy of the gods’ actions, both 
Hera’s and Zeus’. The theme of mortal suffering at the hands of the Gods, or more directly fate, 
is a staple in Greek tragedy. The king, like the reader of the play, well recognises that the 
suffering of mortal Io is not due to her own actions. And so he sees the suffering of Io as 
undeserved. So, the analogy with Io would allow him to see the women as similarly pitiable. 
 
The women’s plea also works in another crucial way that shows the wrong the women 
suffer. The analogy of a heifer driven up “steepling crags” by the wolf allows the king to see the 
precarious situation of the women in an immediate way. The physical extreme where the heifer 
 
on this point. The point is significant if we notice that it is the central irony of the play that the women do not 
recognise the predatory actions of Zeus and repeatedly call for his assistance. On this point see Robert Duff Murray, 
The Motif of Io in Aeschylus’ Suppliants (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958) 56.  
71    A listener may deny the analog relation or pretend ignorance as well. 
72    Line 30. 
73    See lines 300-305. 
ends up reveals the direness of the situation the women are driven to by their unrelenting suitors. 
The king recognises that their unrelenting pursuit has rendered the women with no choice but to 
physically evade them. The mythic story of Io that is alluded to reveals the extreme vulnerability 
of a young woman to the violence of her pursuers. In coming to feel pity for the women, the king 
grasps the wrongness of forcible marriage (or at least the wrongness of relentless pursuit by 
suitors), in the aggression with which the suitors pursue the women, the violence they threaten, 
and the frightful situation the women end up in. Note that neither the women nor the king need 
be able to articulate what sort of threat the men pose or what sort of violence they threaten. It is 
enough that the king perceives the way in which the suitors pursue the women as in some 
important sense predatory and the flight of the women as resulting from the terror that their 
pursuers induce. This way of seeing comes about with a feeling of pity. Feeling pity is to 
perceive and to be pained by the undeserved suffering of the women, to see them as driven to 
precarious extremes by ruthless predators.  
A kind of shift or change in perception and understanding occurs when the king perceives 
the situation of the women. Before the women make the plea for pity, the king asks why the 
women flee from their homes and seems unable to understand why they did so. The plea allows 
the king to apprehend the spectre of physical harm at the hands of their pursuers that the women 
fear and flee from. We may note that in ancient Greek culture, young, unmarried women were 
regarded as untamed (admētos), an adjective otherwise reserved for cattle and horses, and are 
said to be ‘tamed’ by the yoke of marriage.74 So the image the women use of a young heifer 
(perhaps deliberately used by the women to serve their own purpose) recalls this powerful 
association of women and cattle and brings home to the king the vulnerability of young women 
 
74    See Judith Fletcher, “The Virgin Choruses of Aeschylus,” Virginity Revisited: Configurations of the Unpossessed 
Body, eds. Judith Fletcher and Bonnie MacLachlan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 25.  
to predators. Thus, in coming to feel pity in this instance the king comes to see the situation of 
the women in a new light that reveals the harm threatened and inflicted on them. 
 
One might object that the sort of change in the king’s apprehension that the women seek 
to achieve through the analogy is problematic because the warrant for the change is not stated in 
the plea. The women have not shown explicitly why certain aspects of their situation that they 
share with Io warrant the attention of the king or why they are relevant. But in fact, the king 
knows why these aspects are relevant. If presented with a hypothetical example where a person is 
in a similar situation, he would judge that the person deserves pity. This is because the king 
shares an ethical perspective, a shared set of social and ethical norms, with the suppliant women, 
specifically norms concerning the grounds for pity and the moral appraisals of the actions of the 
individuals as bearing on judgments of deservingness. And as I argued earlier, these perspectives 
evolve from, and are tied to, affective dispositions such as a responsiveness to the suffering of 
blameless persons. This is a way in which broader ethical norms can enter into an understanding 
of a wrong that has not yet been conceptualised.  
The point about the presence of broader ethical norms is crucial. Underlying the king’s 
discernment that the women are suffering undeservedly, notions of moral desert and related 
norms bearing on pity are at play. Aristotle discusses some ethical norms as “unwritten” laws 
and as customs (ethē) which are inculcated through habituation (note that ethē refers also to 
habits) and are learnt in the early stages of moral instruction by children.75 Perhaps, the king may 
recognise the wrongness of the women’s situation in the broad sense in which the women’s well-
being (and flourishing) is already affected and further endangered. The king may also perceive 
 
75    Customs translates τὰ ἔθη. Politics 1287b6-10. 
the force of the comparison of the women to heifers, young farm animals that require the 
protection of men from wild predators, where the notion of necessity is pragmatic but also 
customary and moral. Such justificatory reasons may exist as part of the background of socio-
ethical knowledge, supporting practices and customs and can be made explicit, if need be. 
 
A further objection could be raised. One might argue that the sort of understanding that 
the analogy affords is merely factual and not normative. The thought would be that with the help 
of the analogy the king may perhaps see the way in which the women are cornered by the pursuit 
of the suitors, but not that this situation is wrongful. Perhaps, though the worry goes deeper and 
at bottom is the suspicion that any normative grasp requires explicit thought. Yet, it is not 
evident that this is so. The king does not merely grasp that the women are cornered, if he does 
grasp the analogy, but that they are cornered in a way that a heifer driven by a wolf is, and so the 
king perceives that the women are vulnerable to serious harm and are driven to this situation by 
the predator. His perception is affectively and normatively charged. He becomes painfully aware 
of the extremity of danger the women are in and the violence of the men’s predatory pursuit.  To 
see the situation in this way is to perceive or to grasp that the women are being wronged.76  
We can generalise the sort of appeal that allows the women here to communicate their 
feeling of wrong. The women’s’ plea is comparable to “reasoning using paradeigma 
(paradigmatic example)” as Aristotle describes it in Rhetoric II.24. Such reasoning is based on 
showing the likeness (similarities) between two cases where one of the two cases is more 
familiar than the other and serves as the example, though the similarities between the two are not 
 
76    On this point see Nancy Sherman, 170-171. Sherman writes, “To respond compassionately to a loved one who is 
suffering may not simply be a matter of (intellectually) seeing …but of seeing with an intensity and resolution that is 
itself characterized by compassion. One would not have seen in that way unless one had certain feelings.”  
made explicit. Here, the plea of the women relies on shared mythic knowledge about Io and 
common knowledge of predators and the threat they pose to human society. The point about the 
use of myth and a known example can be generalised for affective appeals. 
 
What is significant about such reasoning for our purposes is that the speaker need not 
specify precisely what this sort of injustice is or state the similarities between the analogs. In 
Aristotle’s notion of argument from paradeigma, as Burnyeat notes, the reasoner does not need 
to formulate the “covering generalisation” that the two instances fall under.77 The “covering 
generalisation” is not obvious or present to the mind of the reasoner nor does it have to be made 
evident for the argument to be rationally convincing to him. The awareness of important 
similarities between the two instances is enough for a listener to reasonably conclude that the 
women suffer from the sort of injustice (or a similar sort of injustice) that Io had suffered from.78  
The process here seems to involve the imaginative perception (or recognition) of one case 
in terms of another; the case of the suppliant “is seen or comprehended in something else.”79 It 
seems unmediated by observation of similarities between the two instances. When we hear or 
read an evocative simile, we grasp it without needing to check or note particular similarities 
between the analogs.80 Similarly, in the example from The Suppliants, it seems that the threat of 
 
77  As Burnyeat has noted, arguments from example do not require that the arguer state formulate the “covering 
generalisation.” Plausibly, such a generalisation is graspable even if not explicitly grasped by the person who hears 
the argument. See Burnyeat, “The Origins of Non-Deductive Inference”, repr. in Explorations in Ancient and 
Modern Philosophy Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 112–151. 
78   However, I do not mean to suggest that in making this vivid plea the women are presenting an argument, though the 
plea is comparable to an argument. The king is not engaged in explicit reasoning in grasping the plea. He need only 
recognise the way in which the women are wronged by unrelenting suitors who threaten further harm through the 
example of a young heifer, or Io, or both. 
79    On this point see Stephen Halliwell, “Pleasure, Understanding, and Emotion in Aristotle's Poetics,” in, Essays on 
Aristotle's Poetics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 248. 
80    On this point see Elisabeth Camp, “Metaphor and that certain ‘'Je Ne Sais Quoi,” Philosophical Studies 129, no. 1 
(2006): 8.  
the predator, the wolf, becomes the violence of the suitors, the horrific violence they threaten, 
and which inspires the terror and flight of the women. Through the image of hunted heifer Io, the 
acute vulnerability of the women and their undue suffering due to certain sexual pursuits 
becomes visible. 
To be sure, the similarities that exist between the two cases support and inform the move 
from the example of the heifer to the situation of the women. So, the king has rational grounds 
for recognising the claim of the women. But grasping a plea like that of the women does not 
involve top down reasoning from general principles or known similarities expressed in general 
terms. This is crucial because in such cases the victims lack the conceptual resources that would 
help them to express what is morally wrong about their own experience, as I have discussed in 
the previous section. In the process that I am proposing, the experience of the women is made 
imaginatively available to the king. And in so far as the imaginative work is based on a particular 
example more general concepts need not come in for this experience to be grasped by the king.81  
 
In the case of the women in the Suppliants, although they are unable to argue explicitly 
that forced marriage to their suitors would be wrong because of the lack of ethical terms and 
norms that could support such an argument, they are nevertheless able to show the abhorrent 
nature of such force through a piteous depiction of their own situation. Using the evocative 
analogy of the hunted prey, the women convey the similarity between the threat posed by a 
predatory animal and their own pursuers and the harm and suffering they both inflict through 
their unrelenting pursuit.  
 
 
81    Note also that emotions may aid us in grasping similarities that cannot not be explicitly articulated. Emotions 
involve perceptual awareness and attunement to particular sensory qualities such as hostile look or a mocking tone. 
Conclusion: 
 
In conclusion, let us revisit the problem of how communication occurs in consciousness-
raising groups or speak-outs of the sort that Fricker mentions. In sharing personal, particular 
experiences with others, the women likely employ evocative language similar in certain respects 
to the evocative description that the women use in the play. In consciousness raising groups, 
persons gather to share their experiences however poorly understood they are. But these 
experiences would be described in a way that stays true (or attempts to stay true) to the felt 
experiences of the respective speakers. We can imagine Carmita Wood speaking about her 
experience by describing perhaps, the dreadful touch, the revolting brush, pat, or squeeze, the 
sting of the triumphant look of her predator, or other such aspects of her experience. And we can 
imagine that others who recognise the similarities with their own experience would be able to 
describe their experience in similar ways. A woman may communicate her sense of shock, fear, 
or anger, while another woman may narrate her shame or deep discomfort at being harassed. The 
different perspectives opened by these emotions bring to light different aspects of the wrong they 
suffer. So for example, the helplessness of women in such situations, the humiliation implicit in 
the actions of predatory men, and the alarm and dismay that these actions trigger, are revealed in 
the expression of fear, anger, shame, and sadness respectively. Grasping these aspects goes some 
way to understanding the wrong that is being perpetuated, even if the wrong is not yet named. In 
other words, evocative descriptions aid in a preliminary understanding of the experience of 
sexual harassment before it is articulated officially and introduced into a community’s social 
vocabulary. 
 
Though the account I give here is limited to hermeneutical injustice involving wrongs, 
i.e., socio-moral concepts, some directions have emerged for overcoming other cases of 
hermeneutical injustice. It seems plausible that one could turn to affective experiences and the 
recognitional capacities involved in these and in other forms of experiential knowledge for 
cognitive resources. Affective experiences such as shame and fear for instance figure in the 
experience of post-partum depression even where the term for the experience is unavailable. 
And, perhaps, the rhetorical use of language for imaginative engagement and for eliciting 
affective responses might prove useful for communicating generally under all conditions of 
hermeneutical injustice.  
 
Before concluding, I should note that there may be a larger worry about the use of 
evocative language as such. As Fricker notes, the communicative efforts of women who suffer 
from hermeneutical injustice may be treated with suspicion by third parties because of their 
“emotional and intuitive style.”82 The assumption of course is that this form of communication 
stands opposed to the more recognised, logical, disinterested male discourse. Considerable and 
concerted effort to dismantle assumptions about gendered communication is still required. As for 
the kind of appeal that I have in mind in this paper, it is affective speech that is deliberately 
crafted bearing in mind the considerations that a listener might respond to. The women employ 
an example that the king is familiar with and would respond to and so elicit his pity. In so far as 
the women employ affective language it is to engage the affective dispositions and the 
underlying moral commitments of the king. Such purposeful, artful use of language is seen in 
literature and forms a part of political oratory even today. And most importantly, such deliberate 
 
82  Fricker, “Hermeneutical Injustice,” 169. 
use of affective experience and evocative language confers agency to victims to creatively 
express themselves.  
 
In this paper, I have argued for the importance of moral emotions for overcoming 
hermeneutical injustice. I have made two claims. (1) Moral emotions such as indignation can 
furnish a preliminary understanding of unnamed moral wrong. Specifically, they can impart the 
capacity for discerning instances of such wrongs and an awareness of certain salient aspects of it. 
So, the victims of hermeneutical injustice can have knowledge of their experience in this sense in 
virtue of their affective experience. I have argued that the knowledge involved is a kind of 
preconceptual awareness and discernment of some salient features of the relevant wrong. (2) 
Moral emotions that involve broad notions of justice and fairness, such as pity, can be elicited 
from neutral third parties. This can be done through the use of rhetorically employed affective 
speech, as the women in the play, The Suppliant Women, do. Thus, one could communicate a 
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